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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

RAY J. ROBINSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

CASE

vs.

NO..___ __

KATHRYN B. ROBINSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT•s BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a case in which the mother of two minor children sought to have a decree of divorce, entered Nove~IV
ber 30, 1959, and which awarded the custody of two minor
children, then aged 3 years and 7 months, now aged 8
years and 5 years, modified; the district court denied the
petition for modification. Appellant seeks a reversal of
the District Court judgment and custody of the minor
children.
STATEMENT OF FAGrS
Appellant, Kathryn B. Robinson Wilkins, was the defendant in a divorce action filed by her husband, the respondent, on November 24, 1959 (R. 4). The plaintiff
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prayed for and was awarded the custody of two children,
Pamle Rae, a girl then of the age o!f 3 years, and V[cki
Lynn, a ·girl of the age of 7 months.
The appellant signed an appearance, consent and
waiver in the proceedings and a default judgment of divorce was taken against her. The complaint was filed
and heard on the same date, the 24th day of Norvember.
A decree o!f divorce was entered on the 30th day of November, _1959, awarding the custody of the children to their
father, "with the provision that defendant shall have the
right to visit with said two children and have them visit
with her at any and all reasonable times and occasions,
when not detrimental to their health and well-being."
After the divorce respondent remained in Lehi for a
period of approximatey two months and then he went to
Spokane, Washington, taking the children with him, wheTe
he lived with his sisteT (Tr. 23). He remained in Spokane
until June of 1960 at which time he moved with his sister
and children to Couer d'Alene, Idaho, where he worked
in a garage.
In October of 1960, one year after the divorce, respondent married his present wife and the children lived in
a home on Front Street in Couer d'Alene. They moved,
after a period of about four months, to a home located at
1316 Wallace Street, where they resided for approximately
two years. After a period of two years respondent moved
with his family to the town of Worley, Idaho, where he
went into a service station business (Tr. 26).
When the Robinsons moved to Worley they lived in
one home for a period of approximately five months. Next
they morved to the place of their residence at the time of
the trial (Tr. 29).
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At the time of the hearing the respondent had in his
house one child of his present wife by a former marriage,
the two children of appellant and respondent and two children by his present marriage (Tr. 38 and 39). According to respondent, he has an income of approximately
$400.00 per month, (Tr. 39) and must work approximately
10 hours a day six days a week in order to maintain his
business (Tr. 98). Respondent and his family live in a
home, pictures of which are in evidence.
Shortly after the children left Utah in 1960, their
mother went to Idaho to visit them. She went to Spokane in February of 1960 (Tr. 60). The record does not
reflect the period of time which she visited with them at
the time, but it does show (R. 24), "that the defendant has
visited with her children for a period of only a few hours
since the entry of the deccree, November 30, 1959." The
court further found, at line 13 of R. 24, "that the defendant has not been afforded reasonable rights of visitation
with her children."
On April 20, 1962, the defendant filed a motion to
modify the decree of divorce with respect to the provisions
for the custody of the children. The defendant's motion
to modify the decree to grant her greater rights of visitation with the children was first contested by a special
appearance ( R. 18) . In this special appearance, the plaintiff contested the jurisdiction of the district court to modify
the terms of the decree. This was done on the basis that
the plaintiff was a resident of Idaho and that the Utah
court was without jurisdiction to modify the terms of the
divorce decree. The plaintiff's special appearance for the
purpose of objecting to the court's jurisdiction was denied,
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(R. 22) and defendant's petition was granted after a con-

test.
The order modifying the court's decree, which commences in the record at page 23, provided that the mother
should have the right of visitation for a period m one month
during the year 1962 (R. 26). It further specifically r~
served jurisdiction of the court to modify the decree in the
future. It aslo provided that the ·mother should have the
right of visitation with the children during the Christmas
holidays of 1962.
Plaintiff appeared and objected to the prorvision in the
court's order awarding rights of visitation to the mother
during the Christmas holidays of 1962, contending that
those rights of visitation were not to commence until 1963
(R. 27).
Appellant went to Couer d'Alene, Idaho, during the

Christmas holidays of 1962 and br.ought the children to
Utah and flew them back to Idalho at a cost to her of approximately $300.00 (Tr. 68). While in Idaho returning
the children, there was an altercation between the appellant and the respondent which will be adverted to subsequently (Tr. 71).
The children came to Utah during the summer of 1963
and this action was instituted by the appellant.
POINT I
THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE IN APPELLANT'S
CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE· THE ENTRY OF .THE DECREE OF DIVORCE SUFFICIENT TO REQUIRE A
CHANGE IN THE CUSTODY AWARD OF THE DECREE.
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The fullest exposition of the law in Utah with respect
to the right of the courts to modify a divorce decree, and
the right of the party to have a decree modified is as set
forth in Anderson vs. Anderson, 172 P. 2d, 132. The general rules enunciated there are in agreement with the rules
of most other jurisdictions. The most comprehensive treatment of this general subject that the appellant has found
is found in 43 A.L.R. 2d commencing at page 364.
The most frequent justification in conjunction with
other facts for the modification of an award of the custody
of a child is the remarriage of the spouse who has been
deprived of the custody. Ott v. Ott (1932) 127 Cal. App.
322, 15 P. 2d 896; Kelly v. Kelly (1946) 75 Cal. App. 2d
408, 171 P. 2d 95; Farrell v. Farrell (1921) 190 Iowa 919,
181 NW 12; Vullon v. Landreneau (1946) 209 La. 1060, 26
So. 29, 139; Sargent v. Sargent (1948) 320 Mich. 33, 30
NW 2d 422. Other cases to the same effect are cited in
43 A.L.R. 2d at page 371 and following.
However, remarriage is not the only reason which will
justify a modification.
Other factors present in this which have influenced
courts in modifying a decree are: the presence or absence
of other children in the home; the actual care or custody
of the child by one other than the parent; the fact of the
remarriage furnishing a home as opposed to a previous
condition, and the obstruction or difficulty of visitation.
Appellant was 17 years of age when she married the
respondent and she was 22 at the time of her divorce (Tr.
62).
At the time of the divorce of the parties, the defendant had not completed high school (Tr. 62). She was unSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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employed (Tr. 59). Since the divorce of the parties, she
has remarried, having married her present husband on
Decemlber 27, 1960 (Tr. 59). She has gone to school at
night school and finished the requirements for her high
school diploma (Tr. 62-63). She completed a business
school ·course in 1960 and then went to work in a responsible position (Tr. 60). Appellant and her husband have
lived in the same home since they were married (Tr. 76).
Her present husband is a carpenter and in the year 1962
he earned $6,000.00 while being off work for three months
with a broken ankle (Tr. 64).
As is pointed out by the case of Anderson v. Anderson, supra, the presumption that children of tender age
are better off with their mother is not as strong following the entry of the decree of divorce as it is prior to the
entry of the decree. Nevertheless, the same reasons which
motivated the legislature to enact Title 30-3-5 have validity in cases such as this. The reason for this fact is
well stated in the case of Juri v. Juri, a California case, 160
P. 2d page 73 which reads as follows at page 76:
"'it is not open to question, and indeed it is universally
recognized, that the mother is the natural custodian
of her young. This view proceeds on the well known
fact that there is no satisfactory substitute for a
mother's love. So true is this that in this state the
code exacts that she shall have custody of her child,
everything else being equal, unless the child has
reached the age which necessitates a particular education or preparation for its life work. Civ. Code, Sec.
138. In the case of girls it is obvious that they are
particularly in need of the sympathy, affection, consideration and tender care which only a mother can give
-and so normally they should be in her custody.' And
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in Estate of Lindner, 13 Cal. ·App. 208, 212, 109- P.

101, 103, it was said that 'A mother who is both capable and anxious to rear her own offspring should not
be deprived of the opportunity to thus discharge ~the
duty she owes to the child, without a clear showing of
unfitness for the trust.'"
There is nothing in the record, either in the· findings
of fact, conclusions of law or the decree, as originally filed,

(R. 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13) which find that the mother, the
appellant, was other than a fit and proper person. There
is no finding made pursuant to the hearing in 1963 shown
at page 55 and 56 of the record, which finds that the mother
is not a fit and proper person to be awarded the custody
of the children.

The appellant does not claim that the father and his
present wife are not fit custodians for the children. She:
does claim that there has been a substantial change of circumstances since the entry of the decree in 1959 and the
hearing of this petition in 1963.
POINT II
THE CHILDREN'S WELFARE. WOULD BE BEST
SERVED BY BEING REARED BY THEIR MOTHER.
INSTEAD OF THEIR STEP-MOTHER.

Respondent worked .to provide for a family of five
children and to do this he must work approximately ten

hours a day, six days a week (Tr. 98). Of necessity this
results in the children being reared by their step-mother.

For the reasons pointed out in Juri v. Juri, supra, and those
set forth in the case of Woof v. Woof, 169 P. 2d at 961, the
children would be better off if they were in the home of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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their mother. Obviously, the children would be better being reared by their mother in a home with one other child
than by their 'Step-mother in a home with three other children by two different marriages. See also Emerson v. Emerson, 188 P. 2d 252.
That the environment would be better in the home of
the mother is demonstrated throughout the record by the
different standards by which the parties comport themselves. Repeatedly the record shows the rude, uncivil, ungracious and ill-mannered way of living on the part of the
respondent and his wife that bode ill for the children if
their custody is not awarded to appellant.
On two or three occasions after trips from Lehi to
Couer d'Alene or to Spokane for the purpose of visiting
her children appellant has been treated rudely and discourteously. Surely 900 ·miles and five years of time should
enaJble all but the most ill-bred persons to breach past
wrongs or imagined wrongs and be decent to the mother
of one's own children.
As was stated earlier, the children here in question
are little girls and the opinion quoted in Juri v. Juri, supra,
is, if anything, more cogent in the case of small girls than
of young boys.
Without any question, the circumstances of the mother
were very materially different at the hearing in 1963 than
they were at ~the time of the divorce. At the time of the
divorce the appellant was unemployed and she had no way
to earn a living other than that of working as a waitress
( Tr. 59 and 60). She had no place to live, she went to live
with a friend (Tr. 59). In 1963 the appellant had completed her high school education, she had completed a busi-

ness school course.
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At the trial the witness Mona Christenson testified
that the appellant is a good housekeeper and a good cook
(Tr. 11). That the children were well cared for when they
were with her (Tr. 12). She testified that when she and
the appellant went to Idaho to obtain the children in 1963
that they had been bathed but that they were not clean
(Tr. 12).

Respondent's husband is well emplo~ed and expressed
his desire that the children come to his home to live.
POINT ill
TilE CHILDREN WOULD HAVE A MORE STABLE
HOME ENVIRONMENT IF CUSTODY WERE
CHANGED.

The period of time that the children have resided with
the respondent has been one in which they have moved
frequently from town to town and within towns in which
they have lived. When the respondent left Lehi some two
months after the decree of divorce was entered, he went
to Spokane, Washington, where he first worked as a janitor and then for a motor car company (Tr. 23). Then
in June of 1960, some seven months after the entry of the
divorce decree, he moved with the children from Spokane
to Couer d'Alene and went to work at a garage. He worked
there approximately three years and then went to work
for a veneer company.
After the respondent moved from Spokane to Couer
d'Alene, he lived with his sister until he was married and
then moved into a home of his own.
It should be noted that the respondent did not remember the date of his marriage to his present wife (Tr. 25).
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Neither did he remember the birth dates of his daughters
(Tr. 33).
The respondent and his wife lived in two homes in
Couer d'Alene in a three year period and they lived in two
different homes during the period of time that they resided in Worley (Tr. 29).
Obviously it is not in the interest of the children to be
moved from place to place and it is in their interest to reside in one locale where they can become acquainted with
their neighbors and where they can acquire friends.
POINT IV
CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN BY THE
COURT TO THE ATTITUDES OF THE PARENT WITH
RESPECT TO RIGHTS OF VISITATION ON THE PART
OF THE OTHER PARENT.
Courts have expressed themselves to the effect that
children should have the right to know both parents, and
when one parent makes it difficult for the child to know

the other parent, then that fact is a reason for the intervention of the court in making an order affecting the custody of a child. See Ludlow v. Ludlow, 201 P. 2d 579 and
Williamson v. Williamson, 206 P. 2d 605, an OTegon case.
It appears without question that the respondent does
not desire to have the mother of the children associate with
them. This fact is demonstrated by the finding of the
court in the hearing in 1962 that despite a trip from Lehi
to Spokane to visit with her children, that she had only
been permitted to visit them for but a few hours and that
she had been denied a reasonable right of visitation as was
awarded her in the decree of divorce.
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When she instituted a proceeding to require the appellant to afford her reasonable opportunities to visit with

the children, her application was resisted on the ground
that the Utah court had no jurisdiction to consider the
matter. This despite the fact that such contention could
only be labeled frivolous.
When, after having visited with her children only for
one month out of two and one-half years, the court
awarded to her the right to have the children for the
Christmas following the summer of 1962, even that small
concession was disputed by the respondent (R. 27). Respondent does not accord his former wife and the mother
of his children the common courtesies that one normally
expects. When she visited her children in Spokane in 1960
she was accorded only a few hours with them (R. 24).
In December of 1962, the defendant had expended ,the
sum of $300.00 to go to Idaho and obtain the children and
to return the children to Idaho by airplane so that she
could have a few days with them (Tr. 68).
During the lay-over between planes, she was not invited to the plaintiff's home nor was she given any offer
of a place to stay, but rather the respondent's sister made
her welcome (Tr. 69).
Even after this large expenditure and after having been
with her children for only a week and being just across a
street from the children, they were not permitted to remain with her for more than just a few moments prior to
her return to Utah.
An altercation took place in the home of the respond-

ent's sister. The record shows that the fight took place
in the rear of the home where the appellant was a guest.
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The respondent entered the home of his sister, he and his
wife went down a hall and through a room and into the
bathroom there to confront the appellant and mother of
the children and engage in an altercation in the presence
of orne of the children (Tr. 38).
The attitude of the appellant should be contrasted with
that of the respondent. Without any hesitation she made
the children available to him when he came to Utah during the period of time that the children were awarded to
her (Tr. 49). She invited him into her home as any normal person would. She encouraged the children to visit
with their father's parents, all of this in great contrast to
the treatment that she received at his hands.
CONCLUSION

From all of the foregoing, it clearly appears that the
children would be better off with their mother and that
minor children, particularly girls, should be reared by their
mother as opposed to their step-mother, if the mother is
a fit and proper person. In the instant case the mother
is better able financially to support the children. She would
furn.ish a more stable environment; she would rear the
children to be more gracious and hospitable; she could bestow a mother's love upon them; and the change of circum~tances has been sufficient since the time of the entry
of the decree to justify the court in making an award
changing the custody of the children.
Respectfully submitted,

DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR.
Attorney for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

